Propensity Score Matching, a Distance-Based Measure of Migration, and the Wage Growth of Young Men by John C. Ham et al.
 
 
Propensity Score Matching, a Distance-Based Measure of 

















Our analysis of migration differs from previous research in three important aspects.  First, we 
exploit the confidential geocoding in the NLSY79 to obtain a distance-based measure.  Second, we let the 
effect of migration on wage growth differ by schooling level.  Third, we use propensity score matching to 
measure the effect of migration on the wages of those who move.  We develop an economic model and use 
it to (i) assess the appropriateness of matching as an econometric method for studying migration and (ii) 
choose the conditioning variables used in the matching procedure. Our data set provides a rich array of 
variables on which to match.  We find a significant effect of migration on the wage growth of college 
graduates of 10 percent, and a marginally significant effect for high school dropouts of –12 percent.  If we 
use either a measure of migration based on moving across county lines or state lines, the significant effects 
of migration for college graduates and dropouts disappear.  
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I.   Introduction 
Internal migration is an important economic phenomenon in the United States. Between 2002 and 
2003, about 40.1 million Americans moved, and about 60 percent of these movers were 20 to 29 
years old.
1  Labor economists typically model migration as an investment in human capital, and a 
natural question to ask is what the return to this investment is in terms of higher wages. While 
this issue has received some attention, previous empirical research has focused more on the 
causes of moving rather than on the consequences. Most migration studies find that factors such 
as age, education, job tenure, wage on the current job, skills, family composition, length of 
residence in the current location, local amenities, and the local cost of living affect the migration 
decision.  However, evidence on whether moving increases wages is mixed.  By using data on 
young men from the 1979-1996 waves of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79), we attempt in this paper to identify the average individual contemporaneous wage 
gain from U.S. internal migration for those who move. 
We contribute to migration research in several aspects.  First, we allow migration effects 
to differ across education groups and find that this distinction is important.
2  Previous studies pool 
different education groups to estimate average returns for all migrants.  If returns to migration are 
positive for some education group(s), such as college graduates, and negative or zero for other 
groups, then the overall sample average may be statistically indistinguishable from zero.  We find 
a significant positive migration effect for college graduates of around 10 percent. We also find a 
marginally significant negative effect for high school dropouts of about –12 percent.  For the 
overall sample and the other educational groups, we do not find a significant migration effect. 
Second, we use a distance-based measure of migration instead of a measure based on 
moving across a state or county line.  By exploiting the confidential geocoding of the data by the 
Center for Human Resource Research at the Ohio State University, we can obtain the exact 
latitude and longitude of the respondent’s residence at the time of each interview.  This allows us 
to calculate a distance-based measure of migration.  Compared to a measure based on moving 
across a state or county line, the measures commonly used in the literature, the distance-based 
measure of migration corresponds more closely to the theoretical notion of changing local labor 
markets described by Hanushek (1973).  We find that measuring migration by changing state 
underestimates migration by about 36%, and measuring migration by changing county 
overestimates migration by about 43%.  Further, we are not able to find a significant migration 
                                                 
1 See http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-549.pdf 
2 To the best of our knowledge, Yankow (1999) is the only other author who allows migration effects to 
differ by education.    2
effect for college graduates or high school dropouts by using these alternative measures of 
moving across state or county.  
Third, selection bias can be a severe problem in migration studies. Further, we argue 
below that investigating the effect of migration on those who move is at least as interesting as 
examining the unconditional migration effect. For both these reasons we use propensity score 
matching method (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) to address this problem.  We use a theoretical 
model to ascertain the appropriateness of matching for our empirical problem. From an empirical 
perspective, matching requires a strong ignorable treatment assignment assumption, which may 
not seem completely reasonable in many applications. From a theoretical perspective, if an 
individual knows more about his wage on his new job than the researcher, the condition necessary 
for matching to be valid will not hold. However, we use our theoretical model to show that as a 
practical matter, if matching and differencing do a good job of eliminating the permanent 
component of wages, the violation of ignorable treatment assignment is likely to be relatively 
minor. Thus, many economists are likely to consider matching as a reasonable empirical strategy. 
This theoretical model also helps us determine the appropriate variables on which to base the 
matching, and the NLSY79 data provide a rich set of such variables.  Our results are not sensitive 
to the propensity score model specification, bandwidth choice and trimming level, and they pass 
balancing tests and a specification test.  
Potentially of use to other applied researchers are the following findings.  First, there is 
no advantage in going to higher order polynomials than the local linear regression in the matching 
procedure, and there may well be a cost in terms of overparamaterizing the model.  Second, a 
variable bandwidth works well for us, and the results are not sensitive to the size of the 
bandwidth.  Third, the Andrews-Buchinsky (2000, 2001) procedure for choosing the number of 
bootstrap repetitions is quite helpful, and in one case suggests a higher number of repetitions than 
the number often used by applied researchers.  In the case of this estimator, using too small a 
number of bootstrap repetitions gives misleading results. 
Our paper is organized as follows. We review the migration literature in Section II. In 
Section III we review the matching literature and present our econometric model.  In Section IV 
we use our theoretical model to examine the assumption of ignorable treatment assignment that 
underlies all matching studies.  The next two sections describe our data and our empirical results 
respectively.  Section VII concludes the paper.  
   3
II. Literature  Review   
The most common theoretical model of migration treats the decision to migrate as an investment 
in human capital: individuals migrate if the present value of real income in a destination minus 
the cost of moving exceeds what could be earned at the place of origin (Sjaastad 1962).
3  The 
empirical studies based on this model can be classified into two broad areas, for our purposes: 
those examining the determinants of migration and those focused on the consequences of 
migration for wages and earnings.
4  While the determinants of migration are not the focus of our 
paper, they play a crucial role in our estimation of the propensity score.  Polachek and Horvath 
(1977) and Plane (1993) find that migration propensities vary over a person’s life cycle. 
Geographic mobility peaks during the early to mid-twenties and declines with age thereafter 
because the time horizon over which gains from migration can be realized grows shorter.  These 
studies also find that the propensity to migrate increases with education. Highly educated workers 
operate in labor markets that compete across broad geographic areas, whereas workers with low 
levels of education operate in more geographically isolated labor markets.  Workers with more 
education also may be better informed about opportunities outside their local labor market and 
better able to evaluate that information.   
In addition, the migration decision is affected by migration cost and the non-wage 
benefits of different locations. Goss and Schoening (1984) provide some indirect evidence that 
households with fewer assets are less mobile, since they find that the probability of migration 
declines with the duration of unemployment. Lansing and Mueller (1967) report that many moves 
are attributable to family related issues, such as proximity to family members or health 
considerations. Presumably being close to one’s family is a non-wage advantage of a given 
location.  
Of course, in the human capital model of migration, expected wage gains, local demand 
shocks, and inter-regional differences in returns to skill play an important role in the migration 
decision. Shaw (1991), Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992b), Dahl (2002), and Kennan and Walker 
(2003) use a Roy model of comparative advantage to explain migration. Although the human 
capital model of migration clearly predicts a higher present value of lifetime earnings for those 
who migrate, the literature on the consequences of migration reaches no consensus on the 
contemporaneous returns to migration. Estimates of the average contemporaneous returns can be 
                                                 
3 See also McCall and McCall (1987).  They develop a “multi-armed bandit” approach to the migration 
decision.  Workers rank locations by their pecuniary and nonpecuniary attributes, and then sample locations 
sequentially until a suitable match is found.  Search costs limit the number of markets sampled. 
4 Greenwood (1997) provides an excellent review of the literature.   4
negative, zero, or positive. Positive contemporaneous returns are found by Bartel (1979) for 
younger workers, Hunt and Kau (1985) for repeat migrants, and Gabriel and Schmitz (1995) and 
Yankow (2003) for less-educated workers.  Negative contemporaneous returns are found by 
Polachek and Horvath (1977), Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992a), and Tunali (2000).
5  Studies 
that find statistically insignificant contemporaneous returns include Bartel (1979) for older 
workers, Hunt and Kau (1985) for one-time migrants, and Yankow (2003) for workers with more 
than a high school degree.   
The sign and significance of the migration effect depend on the sample chosen and on 
how researchers address three critical questions.  First, what definition of migration is used?  
Although all authors have in mind a migration as a change of labor market, most define migration 
as occurring if a geographic boundary is traversed.  The majority of authors, including most of 
those cited above, focus on interstate migration.  A few, such as Hunt and Kau (1985) and Gabriel 
and Schmitz (1995), define migration as a change of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).   
Falaris (1987) defines it as a change of Census region. Finally, some authors, such as Linneman 
and Graves (1983), study inter-county migration.  By comparing alternate definitions of 
migration, we show later that migration counts are highly sensitive to the definition used and that 
the estimated returns to migration are also sensitive to the definition of migration.
6 
The second question affecting the estimated effect of migration concerns the choice of 
comparison group.  Most authors use all workers who do not migrate as the comparison group.  
But it is well known that there is wage growth associated with voluntary job turnover (Topel and 
Ward 1992).  Since most migrants change jobs, the “return to migration” may confound returns to 
job changing with a return to geographic mobility.  Bartel (1979) was the first to focus on the 
relationship between the types of job separation and migration.  Others, such as Yankow (1999), 
condition on job changing but do not differentiate between types of job turnover.  Finally, 
Raphael and Riker (1999) consider only workers who were laid off.  
Third, what is the treatment of sample selection?  Because migration is a choice variable 
and not randomly assigned, there is no reason to presume that migrants constitute a random 
sample of all workers.  Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980, 1982) were among the first to provide 
evidence of positive self-selection into migration. Robinson and Tomes (1982) and Gabriel and 
                                                 
5 A negative return is not necessarily inconsistent with utility maximization, since a high growth rate can 
overcome a negative contemporaneous effect. Alternatively, Tunali (2000) views migration as a lottery and 
finds that while a substantial portion of migrants experience wage reductions after moving, a minority 
realize very high returns. Individuals are willing to invest in an activity that has a high probability of 
yielding negative returns because of the potential for a very large payoff. 
6 The distance-based measure that we use is also used by Baumann and Reagan (2002) to study mobility in 
Appalachia.   5
Schmitz (1995) also find favorable self-selection.  However, Hunt and Kau (1985) and Borjas, 
Bronars, and Trejo (1992a) find no evidence of self-selection.  
Note that the sample selection studies in migration attempt to estimate an unconditional 
effect of moving or an average treatment effect. We see two problems with this.  First, it may not 
be interesting to ask the effect on wages of moving to a new location for a randomly chosen 
individual. Many individuals will already be in a location that gives them relatively high wages, 
so we could easily expect this treatment effect to be negative. Second, the choice of a new 
location is ambiguous – is it the individual’s best alternative or a randomly chosen location? In 
this paper we use matching to look at a less ambitious, but arguably better-specified question: the 
effect on wage growth for those who move. Note that there is no ambiguity here as to what the 
respective locations are in interpreting this effect.
7 
   
III. Econometric  Model  
3.1  Estimating the Effect of Moving 
Our goal is to use propensity score matching to estimate the effect of internal migration on 
between-job wage growth for those who quit their first job and move.
8  Following the notation in 
the evaluation literature, let  1 D =  if an individual moves and  0 D =  otherwise.  We then define 
the outcome for movers ( 1 D = ) as  1 Y  and the outcome for stayers ( 0 D = ) as  0 Y .  As will be 
discussed in Section IV, we use difference-in-difference matching, so the outcome is the 
logarithm of the starting wage on the second job minus the logarithm of the ending wage on the 
first job for each individual.  Our goal is to identify the average treatment effect on the treated 
(i.e., the effect of migration on those who migrate). 
 
10 1 0 (1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) . EY Y D EY D EY D ∆= − = = = − =                       (3.1) 
 
                                                 
7 See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a discussion of when estimating the effect of “treatment on 
the treated” may be more useful than estimating an average treatment effect. 
8 The seminal paper in the matching literature is Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).  For recent contributions in 
the economics literature see Abadie and Imbens (2002), Hahn (1998), Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
(1997, 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), and Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003).  See 
Imbens (2004) and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a discussion of previous work in the statistics 
literature and empirical applications of matching such as Lechner (2000). See Frölich (2004) and Zhao 
(2004) for Monte Carlo evaluation of various matching approaches. 
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We observe the first term on the right-hand side of equation 3.1.  However, we do not 
observe the second term on the right-hand side (i.e., the wage gain movers would have 
experienced had they not moved).  We will use matching to estimate 0 (1 ) EY D= . However, for 
matching to be valid, certain assumptions must hold. The fundamental assumption underlying 
matching estimators is ignorable treatment assignment (ITA) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) or 
selection on observables (Heckman and Robb 1985).  This assumption is represented by 
     
()
*
01 ,, YY DX ⊥  (3.2A)   
 
where 
* X is a vector of variables that are unaffected by the treatment. This assumption states 
that, conditional on a set of observables 
* X , the respective treatment outcome is independent of 
actual treatment status.  In empirical work 
* X  usually contains pretreatment variables and time-
invariant individual characteristics. 
Since we are estimating the average treatment effect on the treated, condition (3.2A) can 
be weakened to the following mean independence assumption involving only 0 Y   
 
() () 00 ,. E YXD E YX
∗∗ =  (3.2B) 
 
In the next section we use a theoretical model and the variables available to us to argue that our 
rich dataset makes this assumption plausible and thus matching is a suitable estimation approach 
for our problem.     
To identify the treatment effect on the treated, matching also requires that 
 
* Pr( 1 ) 1 DX =< . (3.3) 
 
This common support condition requires that at each level of
* X , the probability of observing 
nonparticipants is positive. (This condition can be enforced by adding a common support 
constraint, as discussed in Section 3.6.)
9   
                                                 
9 Another implicit assumption required by the matching estimator is the stable unit-treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).  It says that the outcome of unit i given treatment is 
independent of the outcome of unit  j  given treatment. To satisfy this assumption, we have to ignore   7
Matching on all variables in 
* X  becomes impractical as the number of variables 
increases.  To overcome this curse of dimensionality, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose 
propensity score matching, which reduces a multidimensional matching problem to a one-
dimensional problem. Specifically, instead of matching on a vector 
* X , we match on an index 
function 
* () PX .  




** () P r ( 1 ) . PX D X ==                                        (3.4) 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin show that if the conditions in equations 3.2A and 3.3 are satisfied, then  
 
  ( ) ()
*
01 , YY DPX ⊥  (3.5A) 
and  
( ) ()
* Pr 1 1. DP X =<    (3.6) 
 
It is straightforward to show that given 3.2B and 3.3, we have 
 
  ( ) () ( ) () 00 , EY PX D EY PX
∗∗ =  (3.5B) 
and  
( ) ()
* Pr 1 1. DP X =<    (3.6) 
If ITA or the mean independence assumption holds given
* X , it also holds conditional on 
* () PX . Of course, we must choose what variables to include in
* X .  We defer this issue to 
Section IV, where we use an economic model to guide our choice.  Fortunately, the NLSY79 is a 
rich data set offering many possible variables.  
  We should note that it is also possible to calculate an unconditional effect of moving. We 
do not do so for two reasons. First, as we mentioned above, we believe the conditional effect for 
those who move is more interesting. Second, calculating an unconditional effect involves using 
matching to estimate the wage gain stayers would have experienced had they moved.  This, in our 
                                                                                                                                                 
general equilibrium effects.  Since our 378 migrants are from a random nationwide sample, SUTVA is 
reasonable in our problem.   8
case, requires matching a small number of movers to a large number of stayers. Not surprisingly, 
the corresponding standard errors are so large as to render this calculation uninformative. 
 
3.2  Choice of Matching Method 
       
We now discuss the issue of which propensity score matching estimator to use.  Let  1 N  be the 
number of movers and  0 N  be the number of stayers.  The outcomes for the two groups can be 










= =  respectively.  Consider member i  of the mover group.  
The simplest method of matching is to use nearest neighbor matching (with replacement). Here 
we approximate  0 (1 ) i EY D=   using  0 j Y , the outcome for the member j of the stayer group 
whose propensity score 
* ˆ() j PX  is closest to
* ˆ() i PX . 
Nearest neighbor matching, although intuitively appealing, is inefficient: it uses only one 
observation in the comparison group to estimate the potential outcome for a treated observation. 
For this reason we do not use nearest neighbor matching, and instead consider more efficient 
matching methods. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998), and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, 
and Todd (1998) incorporate local regression into matching.  For each observation 
1 ( 1,..., ) ii N =  in the treatment group, local regression matching opens a window around 
* ˆ() i PX  
and uses all observations in the comparison group with propensity scores in that window to 
construct a weighted mean  () ()
* ˆ ˆ i mPX  to approximate  0 (| 1 ) i EY D= .  Within the window, the 
closer 
* ˆ() j PX  is to 
* ˆ() i PX , the greater the weight the observation  j  gets in estimating 
() ()
* ˆ ˆ i mPX .  
To formally define local regression, suppose we observe two paired vectors(,) jj wz , 
where  1t o j n = . At each point of interest, 0 W , local regression estimates  0 () mW  by solving 




















−   
−− −   
   ∑∑    (3.7)    
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where  () K ⋅  is a kernel function and  0 () hW  is the bandwidth.  In our case the bandwidth varies 
with  0 W , as will be discussed later. This minimization problem yields 00 ˆ ˆ() mW α = . 
          Applying local regression to our study, we let ( )
*
0 ˆ (,) ( ) , jj j j wz P X Y = .  For each mover 
1 (1 , ) ii N = , we run a local regression at the estimated propensity score  ()
* ˆ
i PX  and estimate 
() ()
* ˆ ˆ i mPX .  Of course, to implement this procedure we must choose M , the highest order of 
the polynomial.  Generally, the larger M is, the smaller will be the asymptotic bias but the larger 
will be the asymptotic variance.  Fan and Gijbels (1996) prove that asymptotically a choice of 
M q = , where q  is an odd number, dominates a choice of  1 M q = − .  The intuition is that 
moving from  1 q−  to q introduces an extra parameter, reducing the asymptotic bias (especially 
in boundary regions and highly clustered regions).  There is no corresponding increase, however, 
in the asymptotic variance. (Their result implies that kernel regression is asymptotically 
dominated by local linear regression.)  Fan and Gijbels (1996) also point out that in practice the 
typical optimal choice is usually  1 M =  and occasionally  3 M = . Thus, their work suggests that 
we should use in our problem a local linear regression or possibly a local cubic regression.   
However, the above discussion does not consider the finite sample behavior of the 
estimators. Frölich (2004) investigates finite-sample performance of matching estimators 
including kernel regression ( 0 M = ) and local linear regression ( 1 M = ). He concludes that 
kernel regression is more robust to misspecification in the bandwidth than local linear regression.  
Two aspects of Frölich’s results are worth noting.  First, his results are based on the use of a 
global bandwidth, and local linear estimators have a well-known problem over regions of sparse 
data with such a bandwidth.  One solution is to use a variable or locally adaptive bandwidth (Fan 
and Gijbels 1996).  We use this approach as discussed immediately below. Second, in Frölich’s 
results, the quality of local linear regression depends on the sample size of the treatment group 
compared to the sample size of the comparison group.  Frölich’s results suggest that local linear 
matching performs reasonably well when the comparison group is large relative to the treatment 
group (a ratio of the comparison group to the treatment group on the order of 5 to 1).  Our data 
include 1700 stayers and 378 movers, and thus we expect that our local linear regression 
matching estimator should perform reasonably well.  
Finally, in calculating the average migration effect for all movers we only match 
individual  j  to individual i  if individual  j  is in individual educational group.  Rosenbaum and   10
Rubin (1983) define such a procedure as finer balancing.  Following Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985), we first estimate the propensity score using the entire sample and then match movers with 
stayers in the same educational group based on the estimated propensity score. 
 
3.3  Choice of the Bandwidth Parameter 
 
The choice of a bandwidth or smoothing parameter is often the most important decision a 
researcher makes in nonparametric regression.  There is a trade-off in choosing the bandwidth: 
the smaller the bandwidth, the smaller the bias, but the larger the bandwidth, the smaller the 
variance.  Basically, there are two types of bandwidths: global (fixed) bandwidths and local 
(variable) bandwidths. The global bandwidth approach uses the same window width at each point 
0 W , while the variable bandwidth approach changes the bandwidth according to the data density 
around  0 W .  In other words, the variable bandwidth approach allows us to use a small bandwidth 
where the probability mass is dense and a larger bandwidth where the probability mass is sparse. 
As Fan and Gijbels (1992, p. 2013) put it, “A different amount of smoothing is used at different 
data locations.”  
Fan and Gijbels (1992) suggest that it is advantageous to combine local regression with 
variable bandwidth.  We use a simple adaptive variable bandwidth proposed by Fan and Gijbels 
(1996).  In their procedure the size of the window  0 ()
n k hWvaries by the point  0 W ;  0 ()
n k hW is 
chosen to include the same number of data points  n k  closest to each  0 W  to fit the local 
regression.  The number  n k  is determined by the sample size n .  Essentially, we want  n k  to 
become larger as the sample size grows but not too quickly.
10  Our variable bandwidth is 




                                                 
10Fan and Gijbels (1996, theorem 4.2) prove that if 
n k →∞such that  0 n kn → and  log n kn →∞, then the 
adaptive variable bandwidth 
n k h behaves asymptotically as  ( ) { } / kn f w, where k  is the number of the 
nearest neighbors,  ( ) f w  is the density function of  ,1 , j wj n =  and n  is the sample size.  This bandwidth 
choice bears some resemblance to the k-nearest neighbor estimates of Härdle (section 3.2, 1990).  
However, Härdle’s estimator puts equal weight on all neighbors, while in our case the weight depends on 
how close the neighbor is to 
0 W . 
11  Ruppert, Sheather, and Wand (1995) derive three optimal fixed (global) bandwidth selectors for local 
linear regression.  We considered their preferred selector, the direct plug-in bandwidth selector (p. 1262), 
but it performed poorly in terms of producing matching estimates with large standard errors.    11
 
 
3.4   The Sampling Variance of the Matching Estimator 
 
We follow the previous literature and use the bootstrap method to obtain standard errors for the 
matching estimators. An important decision is the choice of the number of bootstrap repetitions.  
We follow the procedure developed in Andrews and Buchinsky (2000, 2001).  They propose a 
three-step method for choosing the number of bootstrap repetitions, pointing out that the number 
of bootstrap repetitions chosen by most empirical studies is usually less than needed.  We find 
that commonly used numbers of bootstrap repetitions are much too small for the local cubic 
regression matching estimator, and that inference is affected by using an inappropriate number of 
repetitions. We describe the Andrews and Buchinsky procedure for calculating standard errors in 
Appendix A. 
 
3.5   Allowing the Treatment Effect to Differ by Educational Group 
 
The migration effect may depend on the level of schooling. This would occur, for example, if it is 
much easier for college graduates to search for a higher wage and find a job in a new location 
without moving there than it is for other educational groups.  Let S  denote schooling class and s  
denote a particular schooling level. Therefore, we now estimate 
 
  10 1 0 ( 1 ,) ( 1 ,) ( 1 ,) s E Y YD S s E YD S s E YD S s ∆= − = = = = = − = =      (3.8) 
 
To obtain the first term in equation 3.8, we take the mean increase in wages for those in 
schooling class s  who move. To obtain the second term, we again use matching and only match 
individual  j  to individual i  if individual  j  is in individual  ' is schooling class.
12  I n  o u r  




                                                 




⋅ ∑ in (3.7) becomes  [ ]
js ∈
⋅ ∑ .   12
3.6  Common Support Constraint, Balancing Tests and a Specification Test 
 
The matching parameter is identified only over the portion of  ' X s  support where each mover 
can find reasonable number of stayers in its neighborhood.  To satisfy the condition in equation 
3.3, we add a common support constraint, following the procedure proposed by Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd (1997).
13  If the target trimming level is q , their procedure will trim between 
q  percent and  q 2  percent of participants.  The exact trimming level depends on the data 
structure; the closer the modes and shapes of the two distributions are, the closer the actual 
trimming is to q percent.
14  Since this procedure trims participants only, it will not cause an extra 
boundary problem (in the context of local regression) when we estimate the treatment effect on 
the treated.  Following previous work, we set  5 q = . To test the sensitivity of our matching 
estimators to the trimming level, we also consider  3and 7 qq = =  for our baseline model.  We 
find that our results are insensitive to the choice of trimming level.   
For our model to be correctly specified, the conditioning variables 
* X  should be 
distributed identically across the treatment group and the matching sample.  If they are, the 
propensity score balances the sample. We test whether this is satisfied for nearest neighbor 
matching via two types of tests, paired t-tests and joint F tests.
15    
Paired t-tests examine whether the mean of each element of 
* X  for the treatment group 
is equal to that for the matched sample.  However, these tests are not able to detect differences 
between two distributions beyond the sample means.  Since all matching methods require that the 
two distributions mimic each other at each quantile, instead of just exhibiting similar means, we 
also use a joint F test.  The treatment group and matched sample are broken down into quartiles 
according to the estimated propensity scores.
16  At each quartile, we test whether all elements of 
* X  are jointly different across the two groups.   If a model fails to pass either the t-tests or the F 
                                                 
13 See also Smith and Todd (forthcoming) for details.  
14 In the earlier version of this paper (Ham, Li, and Reagan 2001), we proposed a trimming procedure that 
will eliminate exactly q percent of the sample.  Since our method trims both the participants and 
nonparticipants, it could exacerbate the boundary problem when estimating the treatment effect on the 
treated.  For our sample, our procedure produced results that are very similar to those produced by the 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd procedure described above. 
15 To conduct the balancing tests, we do not need to calculate standard errors for the nearest neighbor 
estimates. Abadie and Imbens (2004) show that one cannot use the bootstrap to calculate these standard 
errors. Abadie and Imbens (2002) provide an alternative means of calculating standard errors for nearest 
neighbor matching.    
16 The number of intervals used in joint F tests depends on sample size. We have 378 movers, so we can 
only afford to break them down into quartiles. If larger samples are available, finer intervals, such as 
deciles, should be used.     13
tests, we add higher order terms or interaction terms until the variables are balanced across the 
two groups.  
As a specification test, we examine whether migration has a significant “treatment effect” 
on annual wage growth on the first job by educational category. The idea here is twofold.  First, 
wage growth on the first job is the pretreatment variable that is closest to our variable of interest: 
between-job wage growth by schooling level.  Second, since this variable is pretreatment, any 
significant “treatment effect” for this variable can only reflect selection bias that matching fails to 
correct.  This test is similar to that proposed for matching methods by Smith and Todd 
(forthcoming), except that they conduct the test over the entire sample, while we test it for each 
educational group.
17   
 
IV.   An Economic Model of Migration, the Ignorable Treatment Assignment 
Assumption and Choice of Conditioning Variables 
 
In this section we develop an optimizing model of migration for two reasons.  First, it 
will aid us in determining the appropriateness of the assumption of Ignorable Treatment 
Assignment (ITA) for our empirical problem. Second, it will help us to choose the appropriate 
conditioning variables.  One may feel that ITA is too strong an assumption to hold in a real-world  
empirical application. Alternatively, one may note that ITA will not hold exactly for our problem, 
since as Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) discuss, it will not hold in a simple optimizing 
model if there are variables determining the returns that are observable to the individual making 
the investment decision but are unobservable to the econometrician.
18   However, we would argue 
that for most empirical problems, the question is not whether a condition holds exactly, but rather 
whether the deviation from the condition is likely to be big or small. Thus we evaluate our 
economic model for several sensible sets of parameter values to investigate how serious we 
would expect the deviation from ITA to be. For some of these parameter values, i.e. when 
differencing and matching do a good job of removing the permanent effect in the outcome 
equation and the migration equation, we would expect the deviation to be relatively small.  Ours 
is the first matching paper to undertake such an exercise, and this should be useful to other 
researchers since other decisions, such as participation in job training or college attendance, are 
consistent with a very similar economic model and researchers also use matching to analyze the 
effects of training and college attendance.  
                                                 
17 Note that we do not include education times annual wage growth on the first job in the propensity score, 
so this is not simply a balancing test. 
18 See also Imbens (2004).   14
 
4.1  An Economic Model of Migration 
 
We modify the Willis and Rosen (1979) model of education and apply it to the problem of 
migration choice.  At the beginning of the period, all workers have quit their first job.  They face 
a choice between accepting another job locally or moving to another labor market and accepting a 
job there.  We assume that moving involves time costs and pecuniary costs.  We also assume that 
switching jobs locally or in the other market involves search costs.  To simplify the notation, we 
suppress the individual subscripts in this section.  Net expected future earnings from changing 
jobs locally and across markets are  ,, kkk NVC k c m = −= , where c denotes the initial labor 
market and m denotes the labor market to which an individual migrates. Further,  k V  is the 
discounted present value of earnings in location k  and  k C is the cost of changing jobs in k .  We 
assume that the utility of location k  equals 
 
11 [exp( )] , kk k k k UZ u N η =+ ⋅  (4.1) 
   
where  1k Z and  1k u  reflect observed and unobserved variables, respectively, that indicate the value 
of living in k  (e.g. amenities, proximity to one’s family, childhood friends, spouse etc.), holding 
constant the net present value of income in the location.  Workers choose to migrate if 
 
11 1 1 [exp( )] [exp( )] . mm m m cc c c Z uN Z uN η η +⋅ > +⋅   (4.2) 
 
Denote the labor market–specific starting wages and wage growth rates as 
s
k y  and ,, k gkc m = , 
respectively.  If the individual takes the local job, the wage at time t  is 
 
  () .
c g t S
cc yt y e =    (4.3) 
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We make the following assumptions. First, workers face an infinite horizon. Second, the 
individual-specific discount rate, r , is constant over time, where  max( , ) cm rg g > . Finally, the 
costs of changing jobs locally or across labor markets enter the net utility function exponentially.  
Under these assumptions, the net utility of changing jobs locally can be written as 
 
11 22 [exp( )] [exp( )], ()
S
c
cc c c c c c
c
y UZ u Z u rg ηλ   =+ − −  −  
 (4.5) 
 
where  2c Z and  2c u are observed and unobserved variables that reflect the costs of changing jobs 
locally and  c λ  is a vector of weights.  The net utility of changing jobs across labor markets can 
be written as 
 
  11 22 [exp( )] [exp( )], ()
S
m
mm m m m m m
m
y UZ u r M Z u rg ηλ   =+ − − −  −  
 (4.6) 
 
where  2m Z , 2m u and  m λ  are defined analogously to (4.5). 
We define the migration decision equation as  ( ) ln / mc I UU = . An individual chooses to 
move only when  0 I > .  Substituting from equations (4.5) and (4.6) and taking a Taylor series 
approximation around the population mean values of ( ) ,, cm ggr yields 
 
01 2 3 1 1




mc mc m m c c
mm cc m c m c
Iy y g g r Z Z
ZZu u u u
α ααα η η
λλ
=+ − + − + + −
−−+ − − −
 (4.7) 
 
where 12 1/( ) 0, 1/( ) 0, mc rg rg αα =− > =− >   3 ( ) [( )( )] mc c m Mgg r g r g α = −− − − − . 
We define the starting wage on the second job
S
k y , the wage growth k g , and the discount rate  k r  
as follows. The equation for the starting wage on the new job is given by 
 
33 3 ln , , .
S
kk k k yZ u k c m γ =+ =  (4.8) 
   16
In (4.8)  3k Z  and  3k u  are observed and unobserved variables (to the researcher), respectively, 
which affect starting wages on the new job.
19 To make it easier to keep track of the error 
decompositions that follow, we scale the following three equations by their respective 
coefficients in the migration equation (4.7).  The growth rate of wages for those who move scaled 
by  1 α  is given by 
 
14 4 4 . mm m m gZ u α γ =+                                                                      (4.9a) 
 
 
The specific growth rate of wages for those who do not move scaled by  2 α  is given by 
 
24 4 4 . cc c c gZ u α γ =+                                                                   (4.9b) 
 
 
In (4.9a) and (4.9b)  4k Z  and  4k u  are observed and unobserved variables, respectively, which 
affect wage growth on the new job, and  4k γ is a vector of returns to  4k Z .  Finally, the worker’s 
scaled discount rate,r , is a function of family background variables  5 Z  and an error term 
 
      355 . rZ u α δ =+  (4.10) 
 
4.2  Error Decomposition 
 
To facilitate our discussion of the appropriateness of ITA assumption, we decompose each of the 
five error terms defined in Section 4.1 into transitory and permanent components. 
We assume 
   ,1 , 4 , , jk jk jk ue j k c m φ µ =+ = =       (4.11a)    
and  
55 5 , ue φ µ =+    (4.11b) 
 
where the '' e  terms represent transitory errors that are specific to each equation and independent 
both of each other and of µ . The term µ  is the common component across the five error terms, 
reflecting permanent factors such as the individual’s personality, persistence, stability, etc. The 
interpretations of the idiosyncratic error terms vary across the equations.  For example, the error 
                                                 
19 In reality there will be a component of the future wage which is unobservable to the individual. In an 
earlier draft we included such a forecast error, but omit it here to simplify the analysis.   17
term in the starting wage in the local labor market,  3c e , represents the (idiosyncratic) industry 
characteristics and size of firm in which the worker anticipates finding a job if he has not yet 
located a job locally. If, on the other hand, he has located a job locally,  3c e  represents the 
idiosyncratic features of the job. Our goal in adopting this error structure is to capture the 
important features of the correlation between the errors from the migration decision equation and 
the outcome equation while keeping the structure simple enough to allow us to obtain interesting 
results.  
 
4.3  Selection and Outcome Equations 
 
Substituting equations (4.8) through (4.11b) into (4.7) and collecting terms yields the migration 
decision rule   
             11 2 2 5
1,3,4
{( ) ( )} 0 , jm jc m c
j
IX e e e e e θβ µ
=
=+ + − − − + > ∑     (4.12) 
where 22 5
1,3,4
{( ) ( )) } jm jc m c
j
β φφ φφ φ
=
=− − − + ∑  and  1 X  contains the unique elements of the 
,1 , 4 , , jk Z jk c m == , and  5 Z .  As will be discussed later, to come closer to the ITA condition, 
we use difference-in-difference (DID) matching, in which the outcome variable of interest is the 
starting wage on the second job minus the ending wage on the first job. We assume that the 
ending wage on the first job is determined by  
 
               66 6 ln ,
E yZ u γ =+    (4.13) 
 
where   66 6 ue φ µ =+ . 
Since the mean independence assumption 3.2B involves  0 Y only, we will focus on the 
outcome variable for the stayers in the following discussion regarding the identification 
assumption.  For cross-sectional matching, the outcome is defined as in equation (4.8); for DID 
matching, the outcome is defined as 
 
33 6 6 3 6 3 6 ln ln ( ) .
SE
cc c c c yy Z Z e e γγ φ φ µ −= − + − + −  (4.14) 
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We show in Section 4.4 that the DID approach helps to satisfy the ITA assumption. 
 
4.4  Ignorable Treatment Assignment Assumption 
 
In this section we focus on DID matching. The extension to cross-section matching is 
straightforward and omitted to save space. As a practical matter, in assessing the appropriateness 
of ITA we focus on the correlation between the selection equation (4.12) and the outcome 
equation (4.14).
20 The numerator of this term consists of the covariance between these error 
terms, and is equal to 
22
36 3 () cc µ φ φβ σ σ −− , where 
22
3 and c µ σ σ  are the variances of 
3 and c e µ respectively.  Thus two factors contribute to this numerator:  the permanent component 
µ  and the transitory component 3c e . A sufficient condition for this correlation to be zero is that 
differencing completely removes the permanent component of the error in (4.14) and there are no 
transitory variables affecting the outcome that the individual knows but are unobservable to the 
econometrician.  We expect that differencing diminishes the role of the permanent component, 
i.e.  363 cc φ φφ −< , but does not allow us to ignore it. To come closer to ITA, we need to 
condition the migration decision and the outcome variable on additional variables  2 X  that are 
correlated with the common component µ  to reduce its effect.  The migration decision equation 
now is given by  
 
  11 22 0 IX X θ θε =++ >   or 
 
** 0, IX θε =+ >    (4.15a)  
 
where  22 5
1,3,4
{( ) ( ) } jm jc m c
j
ee ee e εβ µ
=
=+ −− −+ ∑   , and we have assumed for simplicity that 




                                                 
20 Choosing a different model specification will affect not only the covariance between the two error terms 
but also the variances.  We focus on the correlation coefficient to have a comparable measure across 
specifications. 
21 Here we abstract from the fact that 
* X  only contains variables, in addition to 
2, X that affect both 
migration and the wage growth.   19
** ln ln ,
SE
c yy Xu γ −=+   (4.15b) 
where 
  36 36 () . cc ue e φ φµ =− + −     






2 22 2 2 2 2 2
















++ ⋅ − + + ∑∑

  (4.16) 
 
where  MD ρ  represents the correlation coefficient after matching on additional variables  2 X  and 
differencing, and 
2
µ σ   is the variance of  the new permanent component µ  . In an ideal world this 
correlation coefficient would be zero, but as a practical matter we would like it to be small. In 
other words, the larger the correlation, the less reasonable is the ITA assumption. Further, as a 
benchmark we also consider the correlation between the migration and outcome equations when 






















++ ⋅ + + ∑∑
    (4.17) 
 
We consider the evaluation of (4.16) and (4.17) for several sets of parameter values. We 
first normalize 
22 2 2
56 () ( ) ( ) 1 jk e Ee Ee Ee σ === =  and 3 1 c β φ = = .  Given the normalizations, 
there are three crucial parameters that affect the magnitude of the correlation: i)
2
µ σ  - how large is 
the variance of the permanent component; ii) 
2
µ σ  - how large is the variance of the permanent 
component after conditioning on 2 X ; and iii)  6 φ  - how large is the loading factor on the 
permanent component on the ending wage on job 1, i.e. how effective is differencing.
22  We only 
                                                 
22  Changes in the scale of β can be subsumed into 2
µ σ . There is the question of whether β  should be 
positive or negative. We have focused on the case where  0 β > for the following reason. If those with lower 
discount rates (i.e. those that come from wealthier families) have unobserved factors that make their wages   20
consider the case where  63 c φ φ < , since given our normalizations, it implies that the variance in 
the starting wage for job 2 conditional on the job 1 variables is greater than the variance in the 
ending wage for job 1 conditional on the job 1 variables, and we would expect this latter 
condition to hold.
23  
In Table 1 we select six sensible sets of values for these three influential parameters to 
show the roles of matching and differencing in achieving ITA.  The first three columns contain 
the selected values for 
2
µ σ , 
2
µ σ  and  6 φ , and the last two columns present the values of  MD ρ  
(from 4.16) and ρ  (from 4.17) corresponding to each set of parameters.  Row 1 of Table 1 is our 
base case, where 
22 10, 5 µµ σσ ==   and  6 .75 φ = . We consider this case as reasonable since the 
variance of the permanent component is 10 times the variance of the idiosyncratic components, 
differencing effectively reduces the loading factor on the permanent component in the outcome 
variable by three-quarters, and conditioning on  2 X  reduces the variance of the permanent 
component by one-half. All other cases represent different deviations from the base case, and we 
put in bold the parameter values that differ from the base case in the respective row.  In our base 
case the argument for ITA looks quite good since  0.044 MD ρ =  while  0.596 ρ = . The latter 
correlation indicates that this is a case where if we neither difference nor match on  2 X , we would 
expect selection to be important. In row 2 we show the effect of reducing the influence of the 
permanent component by cutting 
2
µ σ  and
2
µ σ   in half. Now  0.075 MD ρ = −  from (4.16) while 
0.404 ρ =  from (4.17). Next, in row 3 we double 
2
µ σ  and
2
µ σ  , and as a result  0.212 MD ρ =  and 
0.752 ρ = . In row 4 we show the result of less effective differencing by reducing  6 φ  to 0.5 
from our base case, which results in  0.222 MD ρ = .
24 In line 5 we show the effect of less effective 
matching by raising 
2
µ σ   to 7.5, estimating 0.137 MD ρ = . Finally, in line 6 we show the effect of 
less effective differencing and less effective matching by simultaneously reducing  6 φ to 0.5 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
higher and make 
3 α  negative (as is likely to be the case), then 
5 0 φ > . Since 
22 5
1,3,4
{( ) ( )) } jm jc m c
j
β φφ φφ φ
=
=− − − + ∑ , it is the sum of a number of differences (which are likely to be small) 
plus a positive parameter, and thus we think  0 β > is reasonable. We should note that  0 β < would increase 
the absolute value of the correlation coefficients in (4.16) and (4.17). 
23 While we think the assumption that 
63 c φ φ < is reasonable, it is not innocuous. If we change the base case 
in line 1 of Table 1 by increasing 
6 φ from .75 to 1.25, 
MD ρ becomes –0.316. 
24 In lines 4 through 6 ρ  is unchanged from our base case.     21
raising 
2
µ σ   to 7.5. Now  0.344 MD ρ = , which would leave many researchers reluctant to act as if 
ITA holds. If matching and differencing are quite effective, as in line 1, most economists would 
consider ITA a reasonable assumption. If matching and differencing are both less effective, as in 
line 6, ITA does not seem to be a reasonable assumption. (Lines 3 and 4 contain intermediate 
cases on which economists may differ.)
25 The upshot is that an economic model, a priori, does 
not rule out the use of matching as an econometric tool.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4.5  Choice of Conditioning Variables 
 
The above model suggests that we should use all variables in the propensity score that are 
correlated with both the variables that an individual uses to make his migration decision and the 
outcome equation. Recall that  2 X  contains variables that are not usually included in a reduced-
form migration equation that may be correlated with the permanent component in the migration 
decision and outcome equation. We use the following variables in 2 X : the beginning wage on the 
first job, the ending wage on the first job, tenure of the first job and a dummy variable indicating 
home ownership while on job 1.  Our overall conditioning variables in the matching procedure 
consist of the unique elements in  1 X  (the variables usually thought to enter a migration decision) 
and  2 X .  Variables such as age, education, professional status, marital status, race and living in 
an MSA
26 will directly affect wages and thus affect the migration decision.  We would expect that 
home ownership would affect moving costs and would be correlated with the unobservables in 
wages. We would expect the wealth of the individual’s parents to affect the discount rate and the 
migration decision, and we use the education of the individual’s father to proxy family wealth. 
Whether this variable enters the wage equation or is correlated with the unobservables in the 
wage equation is an open question.
27 We include father’s education in  1 X  but experiment with 
excluding it from the propensity score.  
                                                 
25 In an earlier version we had a forecast error in the realized wage if the individual stays, but omitted it 
here to simplify matters. If we put this error in the model, 
MD ρ falls to 0.181 and 0.194 respectively in lines 
3 and 4. 
26 Previous studies show that workers in cities earn more than their nonurban counterparts after controlling 
for earning capability. Glaeser and Mare (2001) suggest that the urban wage premium comes from living in 
the city, not from innate characteristics associated with urban residence. 
27 Willis and Rosen (1979) assume that father’s education does not enter the wage equation, nor is it 
correlated with the error in the wage equation.  However, others may find this assumption too strong.   22
We would argue that for our approach to be credible, there must be factors that affect the 
migration decision but not the outcome variable. Excluding the variables that only affect 
migration from the propensity score will help identification, since individuals with very similar 
propensity scores based on (4.15a) self-select into both the movers’ and stayers’ groups because 
they bear different moving costs.
28 Further, omitting them from the propensity score will not 
introduce bias.  In our economic model, these are variables such as proximity to friends, families 
and spouses that only shift the location-specific present value of income in the utility function in 
(4.1); variables that only affect the cost of moving in (4.5) and especially (4.6), such as the 
distance of the move; and variables that only affect the discount rate in (4.10). For example, we 
would expect individuals who still lived in the county where they were born at age 14 to receive 
higher utility from staying, holding the net present value of income constant.  We would not 
expect this variable to affect wages. 
 
4.6  Comparison to Other Matching Studies 
   
Finally, it is interesting to compare our approach to that used in the literature, which investigates 
matching as a means of estimating the effect of training on wages for those who undertake 
training e.g. Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), Dehejia and Wahba (1999). The 
economic model behind these training studies is clearly very similar to our economic model, 
where individuals undertake training if it pays for them to do so. The matching literature 
concerning training considers the effect of training on those who undertake it (i.e. the treatment 
effect on the treated), which is comparable to our investigation of the gain to migration among 
those who migrate. Comparable to our differencing in (4.14), the training literature often works 
with the difference in post-training and pre-training wages as the variable of interest (e.g. Smith 
and Todd forthcoming). This literature tends to use lagged values of earnings and unemployment 
as the relevant conditioning variables to achieve ITA, analogous to our use of the work history 
and home ownership variables.  
    
 
 
   
                                                 
28 Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) stress the role that these type of variables play in identification. 
   23
V. Data  Description 
 
Our primary data source is the 1979-1996 waves of the NLSY79.  The survey began in 1979 with 
a sample of 12,686 men and women born between 1957 and 1964. Annual interviews were 
conducted from 1979 to 1994, with biennial interviews thereafter.  
The NLSY79 provides a comprehensive data set ideally suited for studying migration and 
job mobility together.  First, the longitudinal aspects of the data make it possible to track the same 
individuals over time as they move across jobs and labor markets.  Furthermore, the NLSY79 
data files include detailed longitudinal records of the employment history of each respondent.  
Second, the confidential geocoding of the data allows us to obtain the exact latitude and longitude 
of the respondent’s residence at the time of each interview.  This, in turn, allows us to calculate a 
distance-based measure of migration and compare our results with more orthodox measures based 
on change of county or change of state.  Our distance-based measure of migration corresponds 
more closely to the theoretical notion of changing local labor markets than do the alternative 
measures.  A change-of-county definition of migration misclassifies as migrants individuals who 
move short distances across county lines but do not change labor markets.  A change-of-state 
definition of migration misclassifies as stayers individuals who move hundreds of miles and 
change labor markets but remain in the same state.
29  Finally, the data focus on individuals at the 
outset of their work careers, a stage that exhibits the greatest moving and job changing. 
In order to construct a sample suitable for empirical analysis, we introduce several 
selection criteria. The sample is limited to young men since the moving decisions of women are 
more complicated.  Because our interest lies in postschooling labor market activity, we follow 
individuals from the time that they leave school. The longitudinal structure of the NLSY79 allows 
us to determine precisely when most workers make a permanent transition into the labor force. 
Conceptually, we define the working career as beginning the first time a respondent leaves formal 
schooling. To avoid counting summer breaks or other inter-term vacations as leaving school, we 
define a schooling exit as the beginning of the first non-enrollment spell lasting at least 12 
consecutive months. Accordingly, respondents are excluded from the sample if the date of 
schooling exit cannot be clearly ascertained from the data. For example, respondents who are 
continuously enrolled throughout the observation period or who have incomplete or inconsistent 
schooling information are excluded from the sample.  
                                                 
29 Kennan and Walker (2003) use a change-of-state definition of migration in their structural model. It 
would not be feasible for them to consider our definition of migration.   24
Of the 6,403 male respondents in the initial sample, 262 were deleted because they never 
left school, or because an exact date of school leaving could not be determined. Further, 576 
individuals were deleted because they did not hold at least two civilian jobs.  Another 116 were 
lost because they did not report hours and wages on at least two civilian jobs. We eliminated 50 
respondents because they reported being fired from their jobs.  We imposed this restriction 
because we wanted to concentrate on voluntary job transitions. Nine respondents were deleted 
because they were not interviewed during the duration of at least two civilian jobs. 
We required that the respondent had at least two jobs that lasted at least 26 weeks, which 
resulted in the loss of 32 respondents.  We also required that the respondent hold at least two jobs 
with average hours of at least 25 per week.  This last restriction did not result in the loss of any 
respondents. To avoid extreme measurement error we required that the respondent report wages 
on at least two jobs of between $1 and $50 in 1990 dollars.  This restriction resulted in the 
deletion of 120 respondents from the sample.  Because we use a distance-based measure of 
migration, we required respondents to have valid residential location data at the time they report 
holding their two jobs.  The requirement of valid location data for at least two jobs resulted in the 
loss of 1479 respondents.  This is the largest single reason for sample deletion and reflects the 
difficulty of geocoding addresses between 1979 and 1989, when address information was sparser. 
We deleted jobs that overlapped for more than 8 weeks.  In this case we considered the 
respondent to be holding two jobs simultaneously and did not treat that as a job transition.  For 
this reason we lost 132 respondents.  We lost another 465 respondents who held two jobs 
satisfying all of the above criteria, but who reported an intervening job without location data.  In 
this case we did not observe two consecutive jobs.  Further, we lost 855 respondents who satisfied 
all of the above criteria but who experienced an interval of more than 13 weeks between two jobs. 
The between-job interval consisted of either a spell of unemployment, nonemployment or 
employment in part time jobs (defined as those with average hours less than 25 or lasting less 
than 26 weeks).
30  Finally we lost 229 respondents because information on the variables used in 
this analysis was lacking.  Our final sample consists of 2078 male respondents. 
To recap, we explore migration conditional on voluntarily quitting the first job.  Our 
movers consist of men who quit their first job and move to a new location while our stayers 
consist of those who quit their first job but do not move. In this study, migration was defined to 
                                                 
30 It is not possible to determine whether the unemployment is correlated with migration. The problem is 
that we can determine the dates of employment changes but only observe location at the interview dates. 
Thus someone who is in a new location at the time of the interview and has been unemployed for 6 months 
could have been unemployed for 6 months in the previous location and have just moved, or they could have 
been unemployed for 6 months in the new location.   25
have occurred if the respondent moved at least 50 miles or changed Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) and moved at least 20 miles.
31  We focus on real wage growth between the first two jobs. 
We call the jobs “job 1” and “job 2” hereafter.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics.  The third column provides means for the whole 
sample, and the fourth and fifth columns show means for movers and stayers respectively.  The 
last column presents the difference in means between movers and stayers. Over 18 percent of all 
voluntary job changes involved migration. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The individual characteristics shown in Table 2 are reported as of the end of job 1.  The 
men in the sample are, on average, 26 years old at the time of the job change.  The movers are 
slightly younger.  African Americans are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to be stayers, 
while Hispanics are equally represented in both groups.  On average, the movers have higher 
education and are more likely to be married.  Prior to migration, movers are less likely to own a 
house or live in an MSA.  
The NLSY79 provides detailed information on each respondent’s job history and on 
characteristics of each job, a feature that makes matching an appealing strategy for estimating the 
migration effect.  On job 1, movers on average have higher starting and ending wages, have 
slightly longer tenure, and are more likely to have a professional job.  Between job 1 and job 2, 
movers and stayers experience, on average, roughly the same wage gain (around 9 percent).  
A characteristic such as whether the father has a college degree are likely to affect 
resources available to finance a move, and movers are more likely to report that their father had a 
college degree.  As a proxy for ties to the local community, we use a variable that measures 
whether the respondent was residing at age 14 in the same county in which he was born.  Not 
surprisingly, stayers are more likely than movers to have lived in their birth county at age 14.  
Table 2 presents systematic differences between movers and stayers.  Thus, there is 
reason to suspect, a priori, that selection will be a serious problem that must be addressed to 
estimate the effect of migration on the real wage growth for those who move. 
 
                                                 
31 Adjacent county centroids are typically about 25 miles apart, so a move of 50 miles roughly corresponds 
to a move two counties away.   26
VI.   Empirical Results 
6.1 Propensity  Score  Models 
 
Table 3 reports probit estimates for the three models of the propensity score for the migration 
decision described in section IV. All models contain variables representing demographics, 
characteristics of job 1, and home ownership. The models differ in their inclusion of the father’s 
education and same-county variables.  From the literature it is not clear whether father’s 
education affects only the resources to finance a move, in which case it does not belong in the 
propensity score, or it is also a proxy for unobserved earning ability, in which case it does belong.  
We believe that the same-county variable only represents psychic costs of moving, and its 
inclusion should not affect the final estimates.  
Model I, our baseline model, contains the core variables and father’s education.  Model II 
contains only the core variables and omits father’s education.  Model III also contains father’s 
education, the same-county variable and an interaction between the same-county variable and the 
professional occupation variable. (The interaction term is added to achieve balance between the 
movers and the matched sample.) By comparing the matching estimates of returns to migration in 
Models I and II, we investigate whether father’s education affects only the resources to finance a 
move, since if it also affects the outcome variable, we would expect the results from the two 
models to differ.  By comparing the matching estimates from Models I and III, we test the 
robustness of Model I to the inclusion of a variable that should not affect estimated returns to 
migration.  
The demographic variables have the expected signs in all three models. Consistent with 
most migration studies, our results show that the probability of migration starts to decline at about 
age 25.  Hispanics are more likely and African Americans less likely to move than are non-
Hispanic whites, although the coefficient on the Hispanic dummy is statistically insignificant. 
Individuals with less schooling than a college degree are less likely to move than are those with a 
college degree.  Married men are more likely to move than are unmarried men.  Individuals 
residing in an MSA when they quit their first job are less likely to migrate than are those living in 
non-metropolitan areas.  Men in professional occupations on job 1 are more likely to migrate.  
Homeownership has a negative and statistically significant effect on migration.  The three work 
history variables (starting wage, ending wage and tenure of job 1) are not significant individually, 
but a likelihood ratio test shows they are jointly significant.  On average, movers have higher 
hourly wages prior to migration than do stayers.      
   27
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Although respondents whose fathers have a college education are more likely to move 
(see Model II), a comparison between Models I and II shows that none of the other coefficients 
are sensitive to inclusion of father’s education. The Model III results indicate that living at age 14 
in the county of birth reduces the probability of migration. The interaction between the 
professional occupation variable and the same-county variable, which is included only for 
purposes of balancing, alters only the coefficient on professional occupation. With this one 
exception, the coefficients are stable across the three models.  
We show the distributions of the estimated propensity score for Model I in Figure 1.  The 
top panel is a histogram plot for the movers and the bottom panel is the plot for the stayers.  Most 
applications of matching on job training programs have shown that propensity score distributions 
for the treatment and comparison groups are very different in terms of the mode and empirical 
support.  This poses a strong challenge for matching.  In our case, the movers, on average, have a 
higher probability of migration than stayers, but the empirical support of the two distributions is 
very similar and the modes are quite close.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
6.2  Balancing and Specification Tests 
 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the balancing tests of the three models. Panel A shows the paired t-
statistics for the difference in the variable mean between movers and the matched sample of 
stayers. Panel B presents the joint F statistics for the difference in the means of all variables at 
each quartile of the propensity score.  All the tests are conducted using the mover sample and the 
matched sample from nearest neighbor matching. We first discuss the t-tests in Panel A. Under all 
three models, the conditioning variables are well balanced.
32  Matching does a good job with 
regard to pre-migration variables such as race, professional job dummy, and past wages that differ 
considerably between movers and stayers (see Table 2).  The joint F tests in Panel B demonstrate 
                                                 
32 For Model I we have shown the balancing statistic for the same-county variable even though it is not 
included in the model.  For Model II we have shown the balancing statistics for father’s education and the 
same-county variable, even though these variables are not included in the model.  These results basically 
confirm the probit results that both these variables affect the migration decision.    28
that the conditioning variables are well balanced jointly at each quartile of the estimated 
propensity score.   
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 presents our specification test.  As discussed in Section 3.6, we examined the 
“treatment effect” of moving on annual wage growth on job 1 by educational category.  Recall 
that since this variable is pre-treatment, any significant “treatment effect” can only reflect 
selection bias that matching fails to correct.  The test statistics in Table 5 are based on local linear 
regression matching.  None of these “effects” is significantly different from zero.
33 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
6.3  Estimates of the Migration Effects from the Baseline Model 
 
Table 6 presents the matching estimates of the effect of migration for movers on wage growth 
from the baseline propensity score model (Model I).  For all three estimators in Table 6, Panel A 
(with a  5 q =  trimming level), we conduct 200, 300, and 1,100 bootstrap repetitions to illustrate 
the importance of choosing a sufficiently large number of repetitions in calculating standard 
errors.  In Appendix A we present an algorithm for choosing the minimum required number of 
bootstrap repetitions based on the three-step method of Andrews and Buchinsky (2000, 2001).  
The minimum numbers are 248 and 1,074 for the local linear and local cubic estimators 
respectively.
34   Most of the literature uses at most 200 repetitions. For the local linear estimates, 
the standard errors from 200 repetitions are relatively close to those from 300 or 1,100 repetitions 
because 200 repetitions are not significantly less than the required minimum of 248.  However, 
for the local cubic estimator, the standard errors from 200 or 300 repetitions are dramatically 
underestimated. For high school dropouts, the estimated standard error increases threefold when 
we increase the number of repetitions from 200 to 1,100.  The large standard errors produced by 
                                                 
33 The specification test does not reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified when we 
use the local cubic estimator. We do not include these results given the problems we report below with this 
estimator.  We use 350 repetitions, which is greater than the minimum required by the Andrews-Buchinsky 
method, to calculate standard errors. 
34 For each estimator, we calculate the minimum repetitions required for the overall effect. We then 
calculate the minimum repetitions for each education group separately.  Finally, we take the maximum of 
the five numbers as our required number of repetitions.   29
local cubic matching indicate the problem of overparameterization (Fan and Gijbels, 1996).  This 
problem is masked when standard errors are calculated using only 200 repetitions.   
In what follows we focus solely on the local linear estimates with standard errors 
calculated from 300 bootstrap repetitions, which is more than the number of replications 
required by the Andrews-Buchinsky method. A 25% bandwidth gives us a wide enough window 
when we disaggregate the data by educational class.
35 When we do not disaggregate by education 
level, there is a quite small, and statistically insignificant, effect of migration.  When we 
disaggregate by education, the effect of migration for high school dropouts is estimated to be -
12%. This estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level but not 
at the 5 percent level. College graduates who migrate experience 10% greater wage growth, and 
this estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. There is no statistically significant 
difference in wage growth from migration for job changers who have only a high school 
education or some college.  Local cubic regression matching produces very large standard errors, 
which, as noted above, indicates the problem of overparameterization.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
There are three issues worth pointing out with respect to the negative estimated effect for 
high school dropouts.  First, we estimate a contemporaneous effect on wage growth of migration.  
Insignificant or negative contemporaneous effects do not necessarily imply that migration is an 
irrational decision from the perspective of the human capital approach.  As noted in Section II, 
some previous studies have found that positive returns to migration often are not realized until 
five or six years after the original migration, and that the initial returns are negative.  It is 
interesting to note that some of the previous studies found negative returns for the entire sample, 
while we find them only for high school dropouts.  Migration may involve an assimilation 
process.  A short-term loss in wage need not, and probably does not, imply a drop in life-time 
utility.  In terms of the model in Section IV, the lifetime utility increases for migrants if the 
growth rate effect dominates a negative or zero initial wage gain. Of course, it may be the case 
that the model is not appropriate for dropouts. They could be insufficiently skilled to solve the 
                                                 
35 To implement finer balancing matching, we first choose a variable bandwidth to give us a comparison 
group equal to 25% of the stayers.  We then use only those in the group who are in the same educational 
category as the mover in question.  Each mover gets far less than 25% of stayers in the local regression.  
We find that our results are not sensitive to a 1%-2% bandwidth change.   30
optimization problem, even approximately.  Alternatively, they may not be able to see wages in 
the other location without visiting it.
36   
Second, unlike most migration studies, our study estimates a migration effect that has 
netted out the effect of job changing, and thus our results do not imply that any group experiences 
a negative return to job changing.  Third, it is possible that return and repeat migration are driving 
the negative returns for high school dropouts, and we do observe more repeat and return 
migration for high school dropouts than for other education categories.
37  To explore this 
possibility, we excluded those with repeat or return migration from the mover sample. This 
modification, however, did not change the negative migration effect for high school dropouts or 
the positive effect for college graduates.  
Panels B and C of Table 6 present the estimates based on alternative trimming levels of 
3and 7 qq ==  respectively. (We drop the local cubic estimator given its poor performance in 
Panel A.)   The estimates are not sensitive to this change in the trimming level, except for a two-
percentage point difference in the return to college graduates between  3and 5 qq == . This 
difference may reflect the widespread finding in the matching literature that the right tail of the 
distribution of returns is more sensitive to the trimming level than are other parts of the 
distribution. 
  
6.4  Robustness of the Treatment Effects to the Propensity Score Specification 
 
Table 7 represents the migration effects estimated from the three alternative propensity score 
models. Panel A contains the estimates from our baseline model, repeated from Table 6, for 300 
bootstrap repetitions and serves as a benchmark.  Panel B reports estimates from Model II, in 
which we exclude from the propensity score the variable indicating whether the father has a 
college degree.  If this variable affects the outcome variable as well as the migration decision, we 
would expect the results of Models I and II to differ. The estimated effects are almost identical 
under Models I and II.  Thus it appears that father’s education significantly affects the moving 
decision but does not provide extra information with regard to unobserved earning ability, after 
controlling for all the other individual characteristics and the lagged variables.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
                                                 
36As one seminar participant put it, “College graduates can search and then move, while dropouts must 
move before they can search.” 
37 Return migration within two years is 36% for dropouts and 24% for the overall sample. Repeat migration 
within two years is 36% for dropouts and 22% for the whole sample.   31
  Panel C of Table 7 reports estimates from Model III, in which we add the same-county 
variable.  Again the estimates are very close to those from Models I and II.  These results suggest 
that living at age 14 in the birth county is a migration cost variable and does not affect wage 
growth.  In summary, the results from the two alternative models suggest that we have a well-
specified propensity score model that is robust to alternative specifications.   
 
6.5 Alternative  Definitions of Migration  
 
Our distance-based measure of migration made possible by the confidential geocoding of the 
NLSY79 data corresponds more closely to a change of labor markets than do two alternative 
definitions of migration commonly used in the literature: changing state of residence and 
changing county of residence.  Table 8 presents summary statistics for all three definitions. The 
first column of Panel A shows the number of movers and stayers in our sample under each 
definition.  The number of people who are considered movers differs substantially according to 
the definition used.  There are only 258 movers (out of 2,078 job changers) who are movers when 
a move is defined as crossing a state line.  In contrast, there are 542 movers when a move is 
defined as crossing a county line.  The distance-based measure produces an intermediate number 
of movers (378).  
Panel A of Table 8 also shows the average, minimum and maximum distances between 
consecutive locations for those classified as movers and stayers under each definition. The 
average distance for movers ranges from 379 miles under the change-of-county definition to 722 
miles under the change-of-state definition.  The average distance for movers under the distance-
based measure is 535 miles.  The average distances, however, mask the potential for 
misclassification inherent in the other two definitions.  
Under the distance-based measure, the minimum distance between consecutive locations 
for movers is 20 miles, conditional on changing residence from one MSA to another.  The 
maximum distance for stayers is 49 miles, conditional on not changing MSA.  However, under 
the change-of-state definition of migration, the minimum distance for movers is 1 mile, and the 
maximum distance between consecutive locations for stayers is 668 miles. When a change-of-
county definition is used, the minimum distance for movers is 1 mile and the maximum distance 
for stayers is 38 miles. Both the change-of-state definition and change-of-county definition 
incorrectly classify as movers those making short-distance changes in residence across a 
boundary. The change-of-state definition also incorrectly classifies as stayers individuals who 
make large-distance changes in residences.   32
Panel B of Table 8 shows the magnitude of the potential for misclassification of movers 
and stayers using definitions of migration based on crossing a state or county boundary. Row 1 
describes individuals who are classified as movers under a distance-based measure but are 
classified as stayers under the change-of-state definition.  These 136 individuals (36% of all 
movers under the distance-based measure) have an average distance of 120 miles between 
consecutive locations and a maximum distance of 668 miles.  Row 2 describes individuals who 
are classified as stayers under the distance-based measure but are classified as movers under the 
change-of-state measure. These 16 individuals (less than .5% of all stayers under the distance-
based measure) have an average distance between consecutive locations of 16 miles, a minimum 
distance of 1 mile and a maximum distance of 44 miles. The last row describes individuals who 
are classified as stayers under the distance-based measure but are classified as movers under the 
change-of-county definition.
38  These 164 individuals (10% of stayers under the distance-based 
measure) have an average distance between consecutive locations of 17 miles and a minimum 
distance of 1 mile. 
  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In Table 9 we re-estimate all stages of the matching model using the two alternative 
definitions of migration. We do so to investigate the potential impact of misclassification, as 
described in Table 8, on the matching estimates. All results are based on Model I, our baseline 
model, with  5 q =  trimming.  Compared to our distance-based measure of migration, the 
alternative definitions yield smaller (in absolute value) and statistically insignificant estimates of 
the effect of migration on wage growth for dropouts and college graduates.  None of the 
estimated effects is significant at even the 10 percent level.  Our results raise the question of how 
previous estimated returns to migration in studies using different methodologies would change 
with a distance-based measure of migration.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
 
                                                 
38 Not surprisingly, the change-of-county definition does not classify as stayers any movers under the 




Our paper estimates the effect of U.S. internal migration for movers who quit their first job on 
real wage growth between the ending wage on their first job and the starting wage on their second 
job.  Our analysis of migration differs from previous research in three important ways. First, we 
exploit the confidential geocoding in the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 1979 to obtain 
a distance-based measure of migration rather than defining migration as a movement across 
county lines or state lines.  Second, we let the effect of migration on wage growth between the 
first and second jobs differ by schooling level.  Third, we use propensity score matching to 
address selection issues and estimate the effect of migration on the wage growth of young men 
who move.  We use an economic model to assess the practical validity of the assumption of 
Ignorable Treatment Assignment (which underlies all matching studies). We find that although 
one would expect ITA to be violated in principle, as long as matching and differencing do a 
relatively good job of eliminating the permanent component of the error in the outcome equation, 
as a practical matter this violation should be relatively minor and thus matching is a reasonable 
empirical strategy.  The economic model also helps us choose which variables should be included 
in the propensity score.  Matching is a “data hungry” estimation strategy, and our data set 
provides a rich array of variables on which to match.  Specifically, we use variables on previous 
labor market history, family background, demographics, and homeownership.  
We find a significant positive effect of migration on the wage growth of college 
graduates, and a marginally significant negative effect for high school dropouts.  We do not find 
any significant effect for other educational groups or for the overall sample.  Our results are 
robust to changes in the model specification. Our models pass balancing tests and a specification 
test.  We find that better data matters; if we use a measure of migration based on moving across 
county lines or state lines, the significant effects of migration on the wage growth of college 
graduates and dropouts disappear. Finally, we provide useful information to applied researchers 
on the highest order of the polynomial when using local regression in the matching procedure, 
and on the number of bootstrap repetitions when calculating standard errors.  
  There are at least two avenues for future research. First, we could look at individuals five 
years after they quit their first jobs to measure the effect of migration on the wage growth after 
relocation.  Second, we could consider migration effects for young women. 
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Appendix A.  Three-Step Method for Choosing the Number of 
Bootstrap Repetitions. 
 
Andrews and Buchinsky (2000, 2001) propose a three-step method for choosing the number of 
bootstrap repetitions.  We follow their procedure to set the proper number of bootstrap repetitions 
to calculate the standard errors for each parameter we estimate.  The following is a special case in 
Andrews and Buchinsky (2001).  
We first define the notations related to our problem following Andrews and Buchinsky 
(2001). θ  is a scalar parameter, andλ  is an unknown parameter of interest. In our case θ  is the 
average treatment effect on the treated, and λ  is the standard error of θ .  B  is the number of 
repetitions, and  pdb denotes the measure of accuracy, which is the percentage deviation of the 
bootstrap quantity of interest based on bootstrap repetitions from the ideal bootstrap quantity for 
which  B =∞.  The magnitude of B depends on both the accuracy required and the data.  If we 
required the actual percentage deviation to be less than pdb with a specified probability 1 τ − , 
then the three-step method takes  pdb and τ  as given and provides a minimum number of 
repetitions 
* B  to obtain the desired level of accuracy.  We use a conventional accuracy level, 
() ,( 1 0 , 0 . 0 5 ) pdb τ = .  
 
Step 1. Calculate initial number of repetitions  1 B   
The three-step method depends on a preliminary estimate  1 ω  of the asymptotic variance ω  of 
()
12 ˆˆˆ
B B λ λλ ∞∞ − , where  ˆ
B λ and  ˆ λ∞ are the bootstrap estimates from B and infinite repetitions 
respectively. Following Andrews and Buchinsky (2000, 2001), we set a starting value 
of 1 0.5 ω = in equation A.1 below.  (The three-step method is not too sensitive to this starting 











τ ω −   ∗∗
=  
 
  (A.1)     
where  12 z τ −   is  12 τ −  quantile of standard normal distribution.  In our case  1 193 B = . 
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Then the minimum number of repetitions is  ( )
*
12 max , B BB = . 
 






1. Base case 10 5 0.75 0.044 0.596
2. Low influence from 
permanent component 52 . 5 0.75 -0.075 0.404
3. High influence from 
permanent component 20 10 0.75 0.212 0.752
4. Less effective differencing 10 5 0.5 0.222 0.596
5. Less effective matching 10 7.5 0.75 0.137 0.596
6. Less effective differencing 
and less effective matching 10 7.5 0.5 0.344 0.596
Differencing and 
Conditioning on 
Neither Differencing      
Nor Conditioning on  Influential Parameters
Table 1. Roles of Matching and Differencing in Achieving Ignorable Treatment Assignment 
Correlation Coefficient
22 2 2
56 3 Normalization: ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 jk e c Ee Ee Ee σβ φ = == = ==
MD ρ ρ




µ σ  6 φ
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Variable Name Variable Definition
Migration Dummy
Whole 
Sample Movers Stayers Difference
Migrate
=1 if respondent moved at least 
50 miles or changed MSA and 











-0.106        
(0.215)







-0.108    
(0.021)







-0.009    
(0.019)
Dropout








-0.06      
(0.019)
High_school








-0.166    
(0.027)
Some_college
=1 if highest grade completed is 







0.002     
(0.021)
College








0.227      
(0.026)







0.057      
(0.028)







-0.068    
(0.020)
MSA




















0.141      
(0.025)
log(endwage1)








0.142      
(0.026)







0.070     
(0.134)
Professional1
=1 if professional/managerial 











Logarithm of  starting wage on  











=1 if respondent resides at age 








-0.096    
(0.028)







0.132     
(0.024)
Note: Sample size equals 2,078, and the sample consists of 378 movers and 1,700 stayers.
Standard errors of mean are in parentheses.
Table 2. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Means
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Model I Model II Model III
Intercept  -5.86 -5.82    -5.86 
(1.31) (1.30)   (1.31)
Age/10.0     4.12 4.13     4.15  
(0.99) (0.98)   (0.99)
Age**2 /100.0  -0.82 -0.83    -0.83 
(0.19) (0.19)   (0.19)
Hispanic 0.05 0.03     0.04  
(0.10) (0.10)   (0.10)
Black -0.24 -0.27    -0.21 
(0.09) (0.09)   (0.09)
Dropout -0.50 -0.58    -0.52 
(0.14) (0.13)   (0.14)
High_school -0.54 -0.60    -0.55 
(0.11) (0.11)   (0.11)
Some_college -0.38 -0.42    -0.40 
(0.11) (0.11)   (0.11)
Married 0.17 0.16     0.17  
(0.08) (0.08)   (0.08)
MSA1 -0.32 -0.30    -0.26 
(0.10) (0.10)   (0.11)
Professional1 0.34 0.34     0.67  
(0.09) (0.09)   (0.24)
Home_Owner1 -0.53 -0.53    -0.54 
(0.11) (0.11)   (0.11)
log(startwage1) 0.18 0.18     0.18  
(0.11) (0.11)   (0.11)
Tenure     0.02 0.02     0.02  
(0.02) (0.02)   (0.02)
log(endwage1) 0.06 0.07     0.06  
(0.11) (0.11)   (0.11)
Father_college 0.21  0.18  
(0.10)  (0.10)
Same_county  -0.16 
 (0.07)
Same_county*Professional1  -0.37 
(0.25)
Chi-square statistic* 8.08 8.72 8.12
Note: Values in the parentheses are standard errors. 
* Chi-square statistics are from the likelihood ratio tests against the model without the three job 1 variables, 
starting wage, ending wage and tenure. Critical value at 5 percent significance level is 7.82.
Table 3. Propensity Score Coefficient Estimates










Age    -0.0880 -0.2361 0.0176 0.4798 -0.0147 -0.3986
Hispanic 0.0117 0.4583 0.0147 0.5846 -0.0147 -0.5768
Black 0.0235 0.8726 0.0029 0.1123 0.0117 0.4645
Married -0.0059 -0.1609 -0.0235 -0.6167 -0.0235 -0.6483
Father_college 0.0147 0.5020 -0.1026
b
3.7381** 0.0264 0.9761
MSA1 -0.0147 -0.5620 -0.0088 -0.3414 -0.0059 -0.2261
Professional1 -0.0411 -1.3488 -0.0235 -0.8525 -0.0059 -0.1922
Home_Owner1 0.0117 0.5158 -0.0205 -0.7773 -0.0205 -0.8679
log(startwage1) -0.0005 -0.0172 -0.0222 -0.7169 -0.0014 -0.0476
Tenure     -0.0381 -0.2142 -0.0064 -0.0379 -0.0618 -0.3505










F(11, 74) = 1.95 F(10, 75) = 1.99 F(12, 73) = 1.92
a. The Same County variable is not included in Model I.
b. The Father_college and Same County variables are not included in Model II.
c. Each F test is based on the variables included in the respective model.
** Significant at the 5% level.
Note: All tests based on nearest neighbor matching with q = 5 trimming. 
Model I
Table 4. Balancing Tests
1st quartile
Model II Model III
Model I Model III
Panel A:  t-tests

































Note: All tests based on local linear regression matching with q = 5 trimming. In the specification tests, the
wage growth is standardized by job tenure, and standard errors are in parentheses. We use 350 repetitions,
which is greater than the minimum required by the Andrews-Buchinsky method, to calculate standard errors.
Since this variable is pre-migration, any significant “treatment effect” for this variable can only reflect




Table 5. Specification Tests: "Effect" of Migration on Wage Growth                         
on Job 1 by Education Group  






















Estimator Overall Dropouts High_school Some_college College Grads
Local linear 25% bandwidth      -0.56% -12.46% -4.73% -0.75% 10.20%
(200 repetitions) (2.35%) (6.83%) (3.79%) (5.66%) (5.03%)
[300 repetitions] [2.32%] [7.25%] [3.65%] [5.66%] [5.06%]
{1100 repetitions} {2.41%} {7.25%} {3.99%} {5.56%} {5.18%}
Local cubic 25% bandwidth   -1.64% -12.51% -4.90% -4.48% 9.28%
(200 repetitions) (3.48%) (8.72%) (5.28%) (10.75%) (5.81%)
[300 repetitions] [3.62%] [12.52%] [5.89%] [9.93%] [5.62%]
{1100 repetitions} {6.28%} {29.26%} {15.05%} {8.74%} {6.22%}
Local linear 25% bandwidth      0.63% -12.46% -4.73% -0.70% 12.56%
(300 repetitions) (2.27%) (7.40%) (3.83%) (5.73%) (4.88%)
Local linear 25% bandwidth      -0.88% -12.46% -4.73% -0.75% 10.86%
(300 repetitions) (2.44%) (7.08%) (3.95%) (5.64%) (5.29%)
Table 6. Matching Estimates of the Effect of Migration on  Wage Growth from Model I
Panel C: Trimming level q = 7
Panel B: Trimming level q = 3























Overall Dropouts High_school Some_college College Grads
Local linear 25% bandwidth      -0.56% -12.46% -4.73% -0.75% 10.20%
(2.32%) (7.25%) (3.65%) (5.66%) (5.06%)
Local linear 25% bandwidth      -0.32% -12.20% -4.79% 0.03% 10.42%
(2.46%) (7.10%) (3.96%) (5.61%) (5.35%)
Local linear 25% bandwidth      -0.02% -12.80% -4.12% -1.48% 12.03%
(2.51%) (7.39%) (4.14%) (5.66%) (5.16%) (300 repetitions)
Note: All three panels use q = 5 trimming level. See Table 3 for model specifications.
Table 7. Matching Estimates of the Effect of Migration on                                 
Wage Growth Based on Three Alternative Models
Panel A: Model I 
Panel B: Model II 
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Distance-Based Measure Mover 378 535.43 20 3772
Stayer 1700 3.82 0 49
Change-of-State Measure Mover 258 722.28 1 3772
Stayer 1820 12.38 0 668
Change-of-County Measure Mover 542 378.68 1 3772








Change-of-State Measure Undercounts of Movers 136 119.86 20 668
Overcounts of Movers 16 16.00 1 44
Change-of-County Measure Undercounts of Movers 0 ---
Overcounts of Movers 164 17.37 1 49
Table 8. Comparisons Between Movers and Stayers under Three                             
Definitions of Migration 
Panel B. Misclassification of Movers and Stayers When Move is Defined as Change-of-State or Change-of-County 
Relative to a Distance-Based Measure 






















Panel A: Distance-Based Measure
Overall Dropouts High_school Some_college College Grads
Local linear 25% bandwidth    -0.56% -12.46% -4.73% -0.75% 10.20%
(2.32%) (7.25%) (3.65%) (5.66%) (5.06%)
Panel B: Change-of-County Measure
Local linear 25% bandwidth    -1.98% -7.35% -6.23% -0.48% 7.27%
(2.05%) (5.70%) (2.98%) (5.20%) (4.81%)
Panel C: Change-of-State Measure
Local linear 25% bandwidth    0.03% -7.13% -4.71% -1.67% 8.59%
(2.91%) (8.49%) (5.41%) (6.86%) (6.70%)
Note: This table uses the baseline model with a q=5 trimming level.
Table 9. Matching Estimates of the Effect of Migration on                                
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Figure 1: Distributions of Estimated Propensity Score 
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